Visual perception of materials and their properties  by Fleming, Roland W.
Vision Research 94 (2014) 62–75Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Vision Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /v isresVision Sciences Society Young Investigator Award 2013Visual perception of materials and their properties0042-6989  2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2013.11.004
⇑ Fax: +49 (0)641 9926112.
E-mail address: roland.w.ﬂeming@psychol.uni-giessen.de
1 Elsevier/Vision Sciences Society Young Investigator Award 2013.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Roland W. Fleming 1,⇑
Experimental Psychology, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 16 September 2013
Received in revised form 12 November 2013
Available online 27 November 2013
Keywords:
Materials
Surface perception
Computational models
TheoryMisidentifying materials—such as mistaking soap for pâté, or vice versa—could lead to some pretty messy
mishaps. Fortunately, we rarely suffer such indignities, thanks largely to our outstanding ability to rec-
ognize materials—and identify their properties—by sight. In everyday life, we encounter an enormous
variety of materials, which we usually distinguish effortlessly and without error. However, despite its
subjective ease, material perception poses the visual system with some unique and signiﬁcant challenges,
because a given material can take on many different appearances depending on the lighting, viewpoint
and shape. Here, I use observations from recent research on material perception to outline a general the-
ory of material perception, in which I suggest that the visual system does not actually estimate physical
parameters of materials and objects. Instead—I argue—the brain is remarkably adept at building ‘statis-
tical generative models’ that capture the natural degrees of variation in appearance between samples. For
example, when determining perceived glossiness, the brain does not estimate parameters of the BRDF.
Instead, it uses a constellation of low- and mid-level image measurements to characterize the extent
to which the surface manifests specular reﬂections. I argue that these ‘statistical appearance models’
are both more expressive and easier to compute than physical parameters, and therefore represent a
powerful middle way between a ‘bag of tricks’ and ‘inverse optics’.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Background materials probably rivals our capacity to categorize and recognizeDifferent materials—such as soap, velvet and pâté—have dis-
tinct physical and functional properties, which determine how
we can use them; for example, whether they are good for washing,
wearing or eating, respectively. Being able to visually distinguish
between materials and infer their properties by sight, is invaluable
for many tasks. For example, when determining edibility, we can
make subtle visual judgments of material properties to determine
whether fruit is ripe, whether soup has been left to go cold or
whether bread is going stale. When walking or climbing, the ability
to judge whether a surface is slippery or fragile is critical for select-
ing foot- and handholds. Evidently, material perception is useful.
One obvious question this raises is, are we any good at it?
Everyday experience, suggests that we are. We effortlessly dis-
tinguish numerous different categories of material: textiles, stones,
liquids, foodstuffs, and so on, and can recognize many speciﬁc
materials within each class such as silk, wool and cotton. Indeed,
it seems plausible that our capacity to categorize and recognizeobjects—after all, every object is made out of some kind of materi-
als, and we usually know which ones. Indeed, as Adelson (2001)
points out, not everything that we can recognize is what we would
normally call an ‘object’. Some ‘stuff’—like snow, sand or soil—is
just ‘stuff’, without a clearly deﬁned shape. In many cases such
materials are not subject to key constraints—like cohesion and
indivisibility—which we usually associate with ‘objecthood’. De-
spite this, we usually experience no problems recognizing such
materials.
There is experimental evidence to support the intuition that hu-
man observers are good at recognizing and categorizing materials.
For example, Sharan, Rosenholtz, and Adelson (2009) have shown
that subjects can identify a wide range of materials from photo-
graphs even with brief presentations. Recently, Fleming, Wiebel,
and Gegenfurtner (2013) showed subjects photographs of materi-
als from different categories and asked them to rate various subjec-
tive qualities, such as hardness, glossiness and prettiness. Even
though subjects were not explicitly informed that the samples be-
longed to different classes, the subjective ratings of the individual
samples were systematically clustered into categories, suggesting
that subjects could theoretically classify materials through visual
judgments of their properties.
At the same time, there is almost certainly more to material
perception than our ability to categorize or recognize familiar
materials. In general, without actually touching an object, we usu-
ally have a clear idea of what it would feel like were we to reach
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smooth, malleable or likely to crumble in response to force. Even
with unfamiliar materials, we seem to be acutely aware of their
speciﬁc visual and physical characteristics—is it sticky, runny,
spongy, would it feel cold to the touch? We can usually answer
such questions based on a material’s visual appearance. In other
words, in addition to recognizing and categorizing materials, we
also form a vivid impression of their material properties.
In many cases, of course, physical and functional properties—
such as density, thermal conductivity or toxicity—cannot be seen
directly, so our impressions must presumably be learned associa-
tions. Nevertheless, many quite complex material properties do
have a distinctive and vivid visual phenomenology: the frothy head
of a freshly poured wheat-beer, for example, has a characteristic
‘look’, which is subjectively intimately associated with its physical
properties. Because of this rich phenomenology, product designers
go to great lengths in developing the visual ‘look and feel’ of con-
sumer products, selecting and synthesizing speciﬁc materials to
elicit a particular impression of the product as a whole. If we wer-
en’t highly sensitive to material appearance, it surely would not be
proﬁtable for companies to invest resources in perfecting complex
paints and other surface ﬁnishing techniques. Indeed, material
appearance plays a disproportionate role in the assignment of va-
lue to things. Precious metals and gemstones are not especially
useful, yet they command high prices, largely because of their lus-
trous appearance. Again, humans appear to derive a compelling
sense of material properties through vision.
There is a growing body of experimental evidence to back this
up. For example, Sharan, Rosenholtz, and Adelson (2008) tested
how well subjects distinguish between photographs of ‘real’ and
‘fake’ materials—for example real fruit vs. realistic wax simula-
cra—in brief presentations. They found that even with presentation
times of just 40 ms, subjects were able to make remarkably precise
descriptions of the properties of materials and were above chance
performance at distinguishing between real and fake materials.
This is impressive because the image differences between real
and fake materials are usually far from trivial to deﬁne. Real and
fake materials have highly variable but overlapping appearances,
which cannot easily be distinguished based on the overall colour
distributions, intensities, contrasts or spatial attributes of the
images. Clearly there is something about the ‘look’ of the real and
fake materials that subjects rapidly identify, but what exactly com-
prises these—often subtle—appearance differences is not at all
clear. Nevertheless, the empirical ﬁnding supports the intuition
that we can make often quite subtle judgments of material
attributes.
Other work has focussed on the visual estimation of speciﬁc
properties of materials, such as glossiness, translucency or surface
roughness (for recent reviews see Anderson, 2011; Thompson
et al., 2011 or Zaidi, 2011). For example, on the topic of glossiness,
Nishida and Shinya (1998) showed that subjects can judge the
specular reﬂectance of computer simulated glossy surfaces and
Fleming, Dror, and Adelson (2003), showed that this ability gener-
alizes across differences in lighting, as long as the illumination has
statistical structure that is typical of the natural environment.
Motoyoshi and Matoba (2012) showed that varying the statistical
characteristics of the illumination has systematic effects on per-
ceived glossiness, which can be predicted from the low-level prop-
erties of the image. Judgments of specular reﬂectance are affected
by both binocular disparity and motion information (Blake & Bült-
hoff, 1990; Doerschner et al., 2011; Hurlbert, Cumming, & Parker,
1991; Koenderink & van Doorn, 1980; Muryy et al., 2013; Wendt,
Faul, & Mausfeld, 2008), as well as the properties of highlights,
including their brightness, position and orientation relative to dif-
fuse shading on the surface (Beck & Prazdny, 1981; Berzhanskaya
et al., 2005; Fleming, Torralba, & Adelson, 2004; Kim, Marlow, &Anderson, 2011; Marlow, Kim, & Anderson, 2012; Todd, Norman,
& Mingolla, 2004). What cues does the visual system use to infer
glossiness? Motoyoshi et al. (2007) found that glossy and matte
stucco reliefs create different luminance (and sub-band) distribu-
tions, and suggested that the visual system could use the skewness
of these histograms to distinguish between glossy and matte sur-
faces. They found that increasing the skewness of images of matte
stucco reliefs made the surfaces appear glossy. However, others
have noted that skewness is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to pre-
dict perceived glossiness, and have called into question the idea
that such simple image statistics could account for surface percep-
tion more generally (Anderson & Kim, 2009; Kim & Anderson,
2010). Olkkonen and Brainard (2010, 2011) measured how per-
ceived gloss varied as a function of illumination geometry, object
shape and specular reﬂectance parameters, and also found that
subjective matches were poorly predicted by summary statistics
(like skewness) derived from the intensity histogram.
On the topic of surface roughness, several authors have dis-
cussed how the visual system estimates and represents the charac-
teristics of surface relief (e.g., Padilla et al., 2008; Pont &
Koenderink, 2005, 2008), although it remain unclear exactly which
parameters of surface perturbations (e.g., scale, amplitude or pro-
ﬁle) determine visual roughness, or indeed whether subjective
roughness is a unitary quantity. Others have investigated how vi-
sual roughness relates to haptic impressions of roughness (Berg-
mann Tiest & Kappers, 2007), although it is still not clear how
the brain compares or integrates the two. Ho, Landy, and Maloney
(2006) have shown that subjects’ judgments of surface roughness
are systematically biased by the illumination. They found that
glancing illumination angles make surfaces appear rougher than
frontal illumination.
Numerous other studies have investigated how we perceive the
lightness, colour and opacity of thin transparent ﬁlters (D’Zmura
et al., 1997; Gerbino, 1994; Metelli, 1970, 1974a, 1974b; Robilotto,
Khang, & Zaidi, 2002; Singh & Anderson, 2002a, 2002b). By study-
ing the structure of images created by transparent surfaces, a num-
ber of authors have identiﬁed photometric and geometric
conditions that cause the visual system to separate single image
intensity values into multiple causal layers—a process known as
‘scission’ (Adelson & Anandan, 1990; Anderson, 1997, 2003; Beck
& Ivry, 1988; Beck, Prazdny, & Ivry, 1984). For example, thin trans-
parent layers tend to create ‘X-junctions’ in the image, where the
boundary of the transparent layer crosses over contours in the
background layer. However, solid transparent and translucent ob-
jects—like an ice-cube or wax candle—behave quite differently
from thin transparent ﬁlters, and appear subjectively to transmit
light even when these photometric and geometric image condi-
tions are not met (Fleming & Bülthoff, 2005). With solid translu-
cent materials, light scatters within the body of the object,
leading to a characteristic soft, glowing appearance. It is known
that perceived translucency is affected by the thickness of the
material, the direction of illumination, and colour properties of
the image. However, how the visual system distinguishes shading
gradients that are caused by opaque reﬂectance from those that are
caused by sub-surface scattering remains unclear, although sha-
dow regions are likely to play a role, as these are the portions of ob-
jects that are most affected by light that has passed through the
object (Fleming & Bülthoff, 2005). Motoyoshi (2010) notes that be-
cause translucency has much larger effects on shading than on
specular highlights, relationships between shading and highlights
provide important information about whether an object is translu-
cent. He shows that varying the contrast (both magnitude and
sign) and blur of the non-specular components of an object can
dramatically alter its appearance from diffuse to translucent. Flem-
ing, Jäkel, and Maloney (2011) showed that subjects could match
the refractive index of solid transparent materials, although, again
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object and the distance to the background.
Taken together, these ﬁndings seem to support the general idea
that—at least in certain circumstances—the human visual system
can estimate the properties of materials from the retinal images.
With this background in mind, it is interesting to ask how the vi-
sual system categorizes materials and infers their properties from
the retinal images. Our theoretical understanding of material per-
ception is very much in its infancy, but in the following section, we
sketch out some of the key theoretical challenges posed by mate-
rial perception.2. Computational goals and challenges of material perception
Material perception can play many different roles in a wide
variety of tasks, from judging surface friction when working out
how to pick up an object, to choosing which scarf to wear. Depend-
ing on the particular goals, different levels of ﬁdelity of material
perception may be important. In some cases, it is sufﬁcient to make
a categorical judgment of some material attribute (e.g., wet or dry),
in other cases, such as selecting between surface ﬁnishes for prod-
uct design, extremely subtle distinctions are necessary. However,
despite the wide range of high-level uses to which material percep-
tion can be put, I suggest that it is useful to group the underlying
visual processing broadly into two kinds of computations: catego-
rization and estimation.
It is important to point out that these are not mutually exclu-
sive processes. On the contrary, they are likely to be highly interde-
pendent. Estimating material properties (glossiness, roughness,
colour, etc.) is likely to be a key stage in establishing the feature
space within which samples can be categorized. Conversely, know-
ing which class a material belongs to presumably helps infer its
properties (Fleming, Wiebel, & Gegenfurtner, 2013). Thus, the
two processes represent two ends of a continuum in terms of the
ﬁdelity of the internal representation of materials. Nevertheless,
in order to specify the key computational challenges posed by
material perception, it is useful to highlight the differences
between categorization and estimation.2.1. Material categorization
The main goal of categorization is to assign a speciﬁc class label
to a given visual sample of a material, or put simply, to work out
what kind of material it is. Note that this does not necessarily re-
quire a high-precision representation of the material’s properties,
as the end result is a simple label. The primary beneﬁt of categori-
zation is that it provides access to stored knowledge about other
members of the same class. This is especially useful for inferring
characteristics, such as toxicity, which cannot easily be visually in-
ferred for unfamiliar samples. Categorization also has other bene-
ﬁts, such as reducing information, by replacing a complex, high
dimensional visual representation of the sample (e.g. in terms of
2D image features, or 3D shape and surface characteristics) with
a much simpler, lower-dimensional label. Categories can be struc-
tured hierarchically from super-ordinate categories down to the
recognition of individual exemplars (e.g. Textiles  Shirt
cloth  Egyptian 2-ply cotton with blue pinstripe pattern), thus
providing elements of a semantic system for understanding how
the world of materials is organized.
From a computational point of view, material categorization is
much like categorization of any other kind of entity (e.g., object
categorization), in which the key computational challenge is estab-
lishing category boundaries through experience with exemplars.
Theoretical approaches to categorization typically represent differ-
ent exemplars as points in a high-dimensional ‘feature space’, andinfer category boundaries in this space either using unsupervised
learning techniques, such as clustering, which identify natural
modes in the distribution of samples within the feature space, or
through supervised learning techniques, such as support vector ma-
chines, which use explicit knowledge of class membership during
training to determine boundaries. Having established category
boundaries through learning, novel exemplars are classiﬁed simply
by comparing their position in the feature space to these
boundaries.
It seems reasonable that a theory of human material categoriza-
tion could proceed more or less along these standard lines,
although attempts to achieve human levels of categorization per-
formance have not been very successful so far. For example, Liu
et al. (2010) developed a Bayesian model for classifying photos of
different materials, based on a large number of low- and mid-level
image features. Through training, the algorithm identiﬁes and
combines the most effective image features, but performance
was only 44.6% correct with just ten material classes.
One reason for the relatively poor performance may be that
materials can take on an enormous variety of different appear-
ances, possibly even larger than scenes or objects, for example. De-
spite the fact that scenes—such as ofﬁces, beaches or forests—may
contain many elements, there is a surprising degree of regularity in
the overall spatial organization of typical exemplars, at least for
typical views (Oliva & Torralba, 2001; Torralba & Oliva, 2003). This
regularity enables quite reliable scene classiﬁcation through sim-
ple image descriptions, like the ‘gist operator’ (Greene & Oliva,
2009; Oliva & Torralba, 2006). Object appearance can change dra-
matically depending on lighting, viewpoint and other factors,
which makes successful object recognition and categorization
challenging (see Rust & Stocker, 2010 for a recent discussion of
the challenges). However, objects do at least typically have a
well-deﬁned shape. Even mutable objects, such as animals, tend
to have a ﬁxed topological structure, with distinctive shape fea-
tures that are invariant across poses and shared by members of a
common class.
By comparison, for a broad material class like ‘plastics’, the var-
iation in possible appearance is huge (Fig. 1): polythene bags, chil-
dren’s toys and swimming goggles have widely diverging shapes
and appearances. Even a given exemplar, such as a plastic bag,
can take on many different shapes depending on the particular ser-
ies of forces and processes to which it is subjected. Because plastic
can be made into almost any shape and can have almost any col-
our, these features are much less diagnostic than for objects. Thus,
material categorization presents the visual system with the signif-
icant challenge of enormous within-class variability.
Recent trends in computer vision and computer graphics have
emphasized the power of very large quantities of training data
(e.g., Hays & Efros, 2007; Torralba, Fergus, & Freeman, 2008). It is
interesting to speculate whether one key to the effectiveness of hu-
man material categorization might simply be the massive quantity
of materials that we have seen and remembered in our past. Per-
haps training a system on comparably large quantities of training
data would yield comparably good model performance.
2.2. Estimation of material properties
In contrast to categorization, the main goal of estimation is to
identify speciﬁc characteristics of given sample of a material, such
as its specular reﬂectance properties or elasticity. In everyday lan-
guage we use colour terms and words like ‘soft’, ‘lustrous’ or
‘sticky’ to describe the characteristics of materials. Visual estima-
tion refers to the process of working out such properties. Estima-
tion is useful for making subtle discriminations between similar
materials, and allows us, for example, to predict how a given mate-
rial would be likely to respond to external forces, irrespective of
Fig. 1. Examples of different plastics with diverse visual appearances. Images from the MIT-Flickr materials database (Liu et al., 2010).
Fig. 2. Varying the parameters of a BRDF model (Ward, 1992) leads to continuous
changes in the appearance of the surface. It is common to pose visual reﬂectance
estimation as the process of identifying the values of the parameters of a reﬂectance
model.
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tion reduces information and tends to group materials together
into nominal classes (at least in the limit), estimation tends to deal
with metric differences between materials along continuous
parameters. For example, if presented with a piece of glazed cera-
mic, we not only make the categorical judgment that the surface is
glossy rather than matte, but also have a perceptual impression of
the degree of glossiness along some continuous subjective scale. In
this respect, estimation is computationally more challenging in
the sense that it results in a higher ﬁdelity of representation (i.e.,
higher information) than categorization. It is also worth noting
that while categorization deals with the identity of materials inde-
pendently of their speciﬁc characteristics (e.g., quartz and granite
are both stones, but they differ in terms of their transparency), esti-
mation deals with properties that may be common to materials of
very different classes (e.g., both quartz and water are transparent
and glossy). In this sense, categorization and estimation may be
complementary to one another.
In many cases, physics has developed sophisticated descriptions
of material properties. For example, the way light is reﬂected from
a surface is completely described using the bidirectional reﬂectance
distribution function (BRDF; Nicodemus, 1965; Nicodemus et al.,
1977), which measures the proportion of light reﬂected in every
direction as a function of the amount of light arriving from every
direction in the hemisphere above the local surface tangent plane.
Differences in appearance between surfaces like glossy plastics,
brushed aluminium or matte paint are fully captured by the BRDF.
In principle, if the visual system estimated the BRDFs of surfaces, it
could represent the reﬂectance properties of any arbitrary mate-
rial. However, even if we ignore wavelength variations, the BRDF
is a function of four variables (two incoming angles and two outgo-
ing angles), making representing arbitrary BRDFs computationally
costly. Fortunately, however, the BRDFs of real materials are highly
constrained and represent only a tiny subspace within the set of all
possible BRDFs. In fact, the reﬂectance properties of many materi-
als can be quite well approximated by analytical BRDF models with
just a handful of parameters (Ashikhmin & Shirley, 2000; Matusik
et al., 2003; Oren & Nayar, 1994; Torrance & Sparrow, 1967; Ward,
1992), and even quite complex materials like multi-layered paintscan often be modelled as the linear combination of a few such
layers (e.g., Günther et al., 2005).
Most analytical models separate reﬂectance into diffuse and
specular components and have parameters controlling the relative
weight of these terms (e.g., albedo and specular reﬂectance) and
their angular distributions (e.g., the spread and anisotropy of the
specular lobe). Varying these parameters has broadly intuitive per-
ceptual consequences for the appearance of the surface (Fig. 2). For
example, increasing the albedo makes the surface appear a lighter
shade of grey; increasing the specular reﬂectance makes the
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increasing the anisotropy of the specular lobe makes the highlights
elongate as seen on varnished wood or brushed metal. Thus, it has
become natural to pose the visual perception of surface reﬂectance
as the process through which the visual system estimates these
physical parameters. When we say that we see a surface as having
a certain degree of glossiness, it is commonly assumed that this is
because the visual system has estimated a speciﬁc value of specu-
lar reﬂectance for that material.
With this in mind, it is typically assumed that as a computa-
tional process, estimation takes some image information (‘cues’)
as input and returns as output a visual estimate of various physical
parameters of the material, perhaps along with a measure of the
reliability or certainty of the estimates. For example, returning to
the example of a piece of glazed ceramic, it seems quite natural
to pose gloss perception as the process of making various measure-
ments of the highlights visible on the surface to derive an estimate
of the magnitude of specular reﬂectance of the sample. When
posed this way, the two key scientiﬁc questions raised by the vi-
sual estimation of material properties are: (1) ‘what are the
cues?’—in other words, which image information does the visual
system rely on to derive its estimate?—and (2) ‘how does the visual
system compute the target material property (glossiness, translu-
cency, viscosity, etc.) from these cues?’. Most research on material
estimation has focused on one or both of these questions. However,
as I argue below, formulating both the goal and process of material
perception in terms of estimating physical properties may be prob-
lematic. I suggest that by reformulating what we think ‘material
perception’ means, we may stand a better chance of explaining
some of the empirical curiosities that have emerged in the study
of material perception (see below), and perhaps also unify catego-
rization and estimation to some degree.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst discuss the key computational
challenges posed by material perception; then discuss the two
main theoretical approaches that have emerged to account for
how the visual system overcomes these. Using recent experiments
that aim to shed light on the mapping between cues and material
properties, I suggest that there may in fact be a third way of posing
material perception.2.3. What makes material perception difﬁcult?
Imagine being presented with two spheres: one is made of a
highly polished chrome-like material, and the other of pearlescent
plastic material, as shown in Fig. 3. Because the two surfaces ap-
pear so different, it can be hard to appreciate what might be difﬁ-
cult about estimating reﬂectance properties from the retinal image.
However, it is important to remember that the input to the visual
system is highly ambiguous. The intensities in the image are a
complex and unknown combination of many distinct physical pro-
cesses, including the lighting, material properties and object geom-
etry. In order to recover the intrinsic material properties of the
surface—and identify which sphere is chrome, and which one is
plastic—the visual system must somehow disentangle these
various contributions from one another.
One reason this is difﬁcult is because the image of a given mate-
rial can change dramatically depending on the context. For exam-
ple, the image of the chrome sphere consists of nothing more than
a distorted reﬂection of the world surrounding it. Therefore, when
it is moved from one context to another, the retinal image changes
dramatically (see Fig. 3). This means that the visual system cannot
recognize materials by simply matching the image against a stored
‘template’. Somehow, the visual system has to abstract what is
common to the appearance of the sphere across these different
contexts.To make matters worse, a chrome sphere could, in principle, be
made to take on any arbitrary appearance, simply by placing it in a
carefully contrived context, so that it reﬂects certain intensities
into the eye. For example, by placing the chrome sphere in a care-
fully designed ‘smooth’ world, it could be made to produce exactly
the same pattern of pixels as one of the pearlescent spheres. Be-
cause the images would be identical, the visual system would have
no way to tell the difference. However, we do not have to go to
such extremes to encounter problems. In Fig. 3, the image of the
mirrored and pearlescent spheres on the left (same illumination)
are actually more similar to one another on a pixel-by-pixel basis
than the two images of the chrome surface in different contexts
(top row). This occurs because the positions of the highlights and
dark regions are the same when the illumination is the same.
This is the fundamental ambiguity facing the visual system:
identical materials can create very different images, and very dif-
ferent materials can create surprisingly similar images. Under arbi-
trary viewing conditions, the image would be completely
ambiguous and the visual system would have no way of knowing
which aspects of the image are due to the material, and which
are due to lighting, geometry or other effects.3. Two theoretical approaches to material perception
How then can the visual system overcome this ambiguity and
estimate material properties? Broadly speaking, two general ap-
proaches have been suggested. The ﬁrst is inverse optics, which is
the idea that the visual system explicitly estimates and ‘discounts’
the contributions of illumination and geometry to the observed
intensity values (Marr, 1982; Pizlo, 2001; Poggio & Koch, 1985;
Poggio, Torre, & Koch, 1985). According to this line of reasoning,
the visual system ‘runs physics in reverse’ to accurately model
the physical properties of the scene, reconstructing the positions
of light sources, the surface geometry and the physical reﬂectance
parameters of the surface from the image. For example, von Helm-
holtz (1867/1962) famously conjectured that the visual system
recovers albedo by estimating and actively discounting the contri-
bution of the illuminant to the observed image intensity. Similar
reasoning plays a role many more recent theories of colour con-
stancy (e.g. Brainard, Kraft, & Longère, 2003; Maloney & Wandell,
1986; Maloney, Boyaci, & Doerschner, 2005; Yang and Maloney,
2003). In order to estimate the reﬂectance of the spheres in the ﬁg-
ure, the visual system would model the scene surrounding the
spheres, estimate that the surface is spherical, and use this infor-
mation to factor out the contributions of lighting and geometry
to the image. What is ‘left over’ once these other factors are re-
moved would be the intrinsic reﬂectance properties of the object.
The main advantage of such an approach is that the visual sys-
tem would theoretically end up with a physicalmodel of the scene,
much like a scene description in computer graphics. The main dis-
advantage is that the visual system is faced with a ‘chicken and
egg’ problem: in order to estimate and discount the lighting, the
visual system would need to estimate and discount the reﬂec-
tance—but this is exactly what the brain is trying to work out in
the ﬁrst place. To get around this problem, inverse optics models
often invoke various kinds of a priori assumptions about the prop-
erties of the world. For example, it is common to assume that the
illumination comes from a single distant point source, or that the
surface reﬂectance is uniform and Lambertian (i.e., completely
matte). This makes the problem tractable, but limits the range of
viewing conditions and physical properties that can be recovered
from the image. More recent computational approaches have
shown that it is possible to successfully separate BRDF and illumi-
nation in a Bayesian framework that uses more realistic assump-
tions about the world (e.g., Romeiro & Zickler, 2010a, 2010b).
Fig. 3. Photographs of two materials in two different contexts. We easily identify the spheres across changes in the illumination, and easily distinguish between the two
spheres.
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adapted to model human visual processing.
An alternative approach to inverse optics would be to identify
image measurements that are diagnostic of material properties,
but which remain roughly invariant across changes in the illumi-
nation. That is, if there are certain image features that reliably cor-
relate with a given material across a range of viewing conditions,
then the visual system could use these measurements to recognize
the material. This way, rather than explicitly estimating and dis-
counting the effects of the illumination on the image, the visual
system would try to ‘ignore’ them, and rather than explicitly esti-
mating physical reﬂectance parameters, the visual system would
recognize materials by representing their typical appearance in
the image. This approach—which we can call the image statistics
approach—has gained considerable traction in recent years (e.g.,
Fleming & Bülthoff, 2005; Fleming, Dror, & Adelson, 2003; Motoyo-
shi et al., 2007; Nishida & Shinya, 1998). The logic underlying such
an approach is as follows.
When we posed the problem facing the visual system we ar-
gued that under arbitrary viewing conditions the image is ambig-
uous. However, in the natural world, viewing conditions are not
completely arbitrary. In the real world, illumination conditions
are shaped by the environment, leading to certain statistical regu-
larities that are generally well conserved from scene to scene.
These statistical regularities in the world mean that a given mate-
rial tends to present certain statistical regularities in the image. For
example, although the precise positions of highlights and shadows
can vary radically from scene to scene, certain features of the
reﬂections (such as the average contrast or blurriness of the high-
lights) generally remain more constant. Thus, a given material will
tend to produce certain tell-tale statistical ‘signatures’ in the im-
age, which the visual system could use to recognize different mate-
rials. Detecting these signatures potentially allows the visual
system to identify materials without having to accurately estimate
all other parameters of the scene. This approach has thedisadvantage that the visual system could be fooled when the as-
sumed statistics of the world are infringed. However, it has the
advantage of being able to handle arbitrary material properties:
as long as a material exhibits distinctive image features, the visual
system can learn these to recognize the material.
We tested this idea by presenting subjects with images of glossy
spheres rendered under different illuminations (Fleming, Dror, &
Adelson, 2003). Their task was to adjust the reﬂectance parameters
of one sphere until it appeared to be made of the same material as
the other sphere while ignoring any differences in illumination be-
tween the two spheres. This allowed us to test the extent of ‘gloss
constancy’, that is, the constancy of perceived gloss across changes
in illumination conditions. We found that when the spheres were
rendered under illuminations that were photographically captured
from the real world (Debevec, 1998)—as shown in Fig. 4a—subjects
were quite good at performing the matches. By contrast, when the
spheres were illuminated under unnatural illuminations, such as
the one shown in Fig. 4b, performance decreased signiﬁcantly. This
suggests that the visual system relies on characteristic signatures
of specular reﬂection. When the tacit assumptions about the statis-
tical structure of the environment are infringed, gloss perception
breaks down.
4. An alternative view of material perception as ‘statistical
appearance models’
One conclusion of our experiments on gloss constancy is that
the visual system is far from perfect. We have ‘partial’ gloss con-
stancy, as changing the illumination can also affect the perceived
glossiness of surfaces. This in itself is not very surprising, given that
numerous experiments have documented the limits of lightness
and colour constancy (e.g., Arend & Reeves, 1986; Amano & Foster,
2004; Amano, Foster, & Nascimento, 2006; Bauml, 1999; Kraft &
Brainard, 1999; Land & McCann, 1971; Gerhard & Maloney, 2010;
see Foster, 2011; Gilchrist et al., 1999 for reviews). These ﬁndings
Fig. 4. Computer simulations of two identical glossy spheres under (a) a real pattern of illumination, and (b) a pattern of random noise that has an unnatural intensity
histogram. Observers reliably report that the sphere in (a) appears glossier than in (b) although the surfaces are identical.
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extent with the lighting. Computationally it is also no great sur-
prise. If the goal of the visual system is to estimate the physical
properties of the surface, and these are confounded with the illu-
mination in the image, then it makes sense that errors in separat-
ing the two sources could lead to mis-estimates of the surface
reﬂectance properties.
However, more recent experiments have yielded some much
less intuitive interactions between scene variable. For example,
Ho, Landy, and Maloney (2008) measured the perceived glossiness
of surfaces with different reliefs. Their surfaces consisted of a con-
glomeration of ellipsoids, forming a smooth, bumpy surface, whose
depth variations were varied across conditions, similar to the onesFig. 5. Images of glossy reliefs like those used by Marlow, Kim, and Anderson
(2012). All four surfaces have identical reﬂectance properties and yet the perceived
glossiness varies depending on the interactions between surface relief (left: shallow
vs. right: deep) and illumination direction (top: oblique vs. bottom: frontal). Image
copyright 2012 Marlow, Kim and Anderson, reproduced with permission.shown in Fig. 5. Subjects judged both the relief and glossiness of
the surfaces. The somewhat unexpected result was that there
was a signiﬁcant ‘contamination’ between judgements of the two
parameters. In other words, when asked to estimate the glossiness
of the surface, the judgments varied signiﬁcantly depending on the
depth of the relief. This is a surprising ﬁnding: why should the
visual system get confused between glossiness and surface relief?
To gain further insights into these unexpected results, Marlow,
Kim, and Anderson (2012) recently extended the range of condi-
tions tested. In addition to varying the relief and reﬂectance of
the surface, they also varied the orientation of the illumination rel-
ative to the surface, so that it either arrived from head on, or from a
more oblique angle. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the way these different
factors interact has very signiﬁcant effects on the highlights visible
in the image. All four surface patches have identical surface reﬂec-
tance properties, yet most observers perceive the patch with shal-
low relief and frontal illumination (bottom left) to appear
signiﬁcantly ‘more glossy’ than the others. In fact, Marlow and col-
leagues found that the interactions between the factors were not
only large, they were in some cases non-monotonic, which sug-
gests that the effect is not a simple ‘contamination’ of one quantity
(perceived glossiness) by another (relief), as originally appeared to
be the case in the Ho et al. study. For example, under oblique illu-
mination, judgments of glossiness ﬁrst increase and then decrease
again as the depth of relief increases. What can account for these
large and non-linear interactions between scene variables in the
perception of gloss?
A key observation that casts light on this question is that the
interplay between illumination and surface relief has substantial
effects on how large and pronounced the surface’s specular high-
lights appear in the image. Shallow relief illuminated frontally
leads to large, high contrast highlights that dominate the image,
whereas when the same surface is illuminated obliquely, the high-
lights appear much smaller and less pronounced by comparison.
This simple insight leads to a key hypothesis about gloss per-
ception: when subjects are asked to report the apparent glossiness
of a surface, it could be that their judgments reﬂect the extent to
which the surface manifests salient specular reﬂections. Put another
way, it could be that subjects use the characteristics of the reﬂec-
tions—their size, contrast, distinctness, etc.—as a ‘proxy’ for esti-
mating the intrinsic physical surface parameters, such as
specular reﬂectance. This makes intuitive sense as reﬂections and
highlights are the deﬁning visual characteristic of glossy surfaces.
While surface reﬂectance properties are not visible directly,
R.W. Fleming / Vision Research 94 (2014) 62–75 69highlights and reﬂections—as the primary manifestations of specu-
lar reﬂection in the image—are visible directly, and have properties
that can be measured relatively easily by low- and mid-level visual
hardware. Glossier surfaces manifest more salient specular reﬂec-
tions than less glossy ones, and thus it makes intuitive sense for the
visual system to attach special import to the size, contrast and dis-
tinctness of specular highlights as a way of characterizing surface
gloss.
To test this hypothesis, Marlow and colleagues asked a different
set of subjects to rate simple image properties of the highlights,
such as their size, contrast and distinctness. These subjects were
not asked to judge anything about the intrinsic properties of the
surfaces themselves, they simply had to focus on the 2D image
appearance of the highlight regions of the image. The results were
quite striking. The authors found that a simple weighted combina-
tion of these latter judgments accounted for all the main trends in
the glossiness judgments, including the non-monotonic effects of
surface relief and the interactions between relief and illumination
direction. That is, it is possible to predict gloss judgments just from
the low-level image properties of the highlights. Thus, when asked
to compare the glossiness of different images of surfaces, what
subjects actually appear to do is to compare the relative salience
of the highlights, based on their size, contrast, distinctness, and
so on.
4.1. Statistical appearance models
The idea that the visual systemmeasures the properties of high-
lights instead of estimating the surface specularity perhaps sounds
so obvious as to be almost trivial. However, it represents a subtle
but profoundly signiﬁcant shift in our understanding of what we
mean by material perception. It implies that the goal of surface
reﬂectance perception is not to estimate the BRDF or some para-
metric approximation of the intrinsic physical properties of the
surface—whether through inverse optics or image heuristics. In-
stead, the goal is to capture the typical ‘look’ of surfaces as they ap-
pear in the image, and to characterize how this appearance tends
to vary from sample to sample. That is, the goal of material percep-
tion is to identify and measure statistically informative appearance
attributes—like the size, contrast and distinctness of highlights—
that capture how variations in material properties manifest them-
selves in the image.2 Rather than estimating physical parameters of
materials, the visual system somehow identiﬁes key image parame-
ters that vary between samples of related materials (e.g., surfaces
with different degrees of gloss), and uses such measurements to rep-
resent the ‘typical appearance’ of glossy surfaces.
With this in mind, the central theoretical speculation of this
article is the following:
We suggest that the brain is highly adept at inferring a type of
generative model of material appearance—a ‘statistical appear-
ance model’—which captures the natural degrees of variation
between samples in terms of easily measured appearance
properties.We suggest that from even a relatively small number of samples
of different materials, the visual system rapidly infers how to parse2 The term ‘appearance’ has different uses in different ﬁelds. In psychology the
term typically refers to the subjective phenomenological impression of surface
characteristics. By contrast, in computer graphics—and to some extent computer
vision—the term ‘appearance’ is routinely used to refer to how surface properties
manifest themselves in the image; that is, certain physical aspects of the proxima
stimulus associated with the material. In this context, we deliberately conﬂate the
two meanings to make the point that the subjective ‘appearance’ of surfaces is
intimately related to the goal of describing regularities in the proximal stimulus tha
they present to the visual system. We suggest that subjective ‘appearance’ is based on
an internal model of ‘appearance’ (what surfaces look like in the image).
3 The segmentation processes may also involve ‘scission’ mechanisms (i.e., source
separation), which parse the image into ‘causal layers’, as in transparency (cf
Anderson, 1997). Although we do not understand exactly how such mechanisms
work, there is extensive empirical evidence that the visual system is adept a
distinguishing multiple superimposed image contributions.l
tthe image into appearance characteristics (like properties of the
highlights) that vary parametrically between samples. Thus, such
a generative model encapsulates the visual system’s ‘knowledge’
about the way samples typically behave, in terms of their changing
appearance. Unlike a physical model, which represents materials in
terms of pre-established intrinsic physical parameters, a statistical
appearance model seeks to discover in what ways different mate-
rial samples look different from one another, irrespective of the
underlying physical basis for those differences (e.g., photon inter-
ference effects, microscopic roughness, and so on). Unlike simple
image heuristics, which seek to approximate physical parameters
by mapping crude statistics—such as the skewness of intensity or
sub-band histograms—directly to surface properties, an internal
model makes it possible for the visual system to predict what
new samples might look like even from only a small number of
exemplars. It is a generative model, which represents the dimen-
sions along which samples tend to vary. It is also essentially a
‘mid-level’ theory of perception, in which perceptual organization
principles—including geometrical constraints—play a central role
in inferring and representing the characteristics of samples.
4.2. How might statistical appearance models be computed?
To give a concrete example of how such a model might be com-
puted and what it represents, let us consider how the visual system
could infer a statistical appearance model from images of glossy
surfaces. Our goal here is not to provide a detailed computational
model, but rather to adumbrate some of the key elements or
processing stages that such a model might contain. We outline
the approach in Fig. 6.
Suppose an observer is presented with a single image of a glossy
surface. The visual system’s goal is to work out in what ways the
image would change if we were to change the properties of the
surface. In theory, there is an inﬁnite number of possible ways that
an image could change, so how can the visual system work out
what other samples, with different properties, might look like?
If the world were unconstrained, this would certainly be an
impossible task. However, the real world is highly structured due
to lawful generative processes, which have systematic effects on
the image. For example, in the real world, moving a light source
does not cause arbitrary changes in intensity independently at
each image location. Instead, shading patterns undergo smooth
and systematic transformations when light sources move. Thus,
we suggest that the visual system can rely on the fact that varia-
tions in meaningful parameters of the world—such as the lighting
or reﬂectance properties of the surface—generally lead to system-
atic changes in the image. The brain’s goal is to characterize those
changes. We suggest that starting with even a single exemplar of a
material, the visual system may be able to cast initial hypotheses
about which aspects of the image might be likely to change in
which ways, and therefore develop an internal model of material
appearance.
Speciﬁcally, we suggest that the visual system ﬁrst uses gen-
eral-purpose perceptual organization mechanisms to parse the im-
age into salient regions or features, such as the highlights and
shadows across the surface.3 This segmentation provides some ini-
tial candidate features (e.g., highlights), which could plausibly vary in
some measurable way with changes in the material properties.
Again, we do not assume the visual system knows anything about
the physical laws of reﬂection, or the properties of surfaces: it is try-.
t
Fig. 6. A cartoon schematic for inferring predicting plausible variations from a single exemplar image.
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from material to material. The assumption is that in general, salient
features are likely to relate in some systematic way to the underlying
properties of the material. Put another way, salient features are
likely to be evidence of signiﬁcant underlying causes—and are there-
fore likely to vary from sample to sample. Of course, not all salient
features turn out to vary in lawful ways, but they at least represent
good initial candidates for building an internal model of material
appearance.
Depending on the properties of the candidate features (as well
as prior experience with other models) it should be possible to cast
initial hypotheses about their likely degrees of variation. For exam-
ple, as highlights differ from their surroundings in intensity, one
plausible hypothesis is that the relative brightness of highlights
might be an important feature: a feature that varies systematically
from material to material. Along similar lines, highlight regions
may also differ from sample to sample in terms of their size, shape,
position or other measurable properties.
We suggest that this set of hypotheses about possible ways in
which appearance features could vary from sample to sample rep-
resents an initial appearance model, which is then reﬁned and cor-
rected through experience with other samples. When new samples
are encountered, the visual system can track how candidate fea-
tures vary to improve its appearance model of glossy surfaces.
For example, conﬁrmation that different samples do have different
highlight contrasts reinforces this element of the appearance
model. In contrast, observing that highlight colour tends not to
change very much reinforces that it is not a natural degree of image
variation associated with glossy surfaces. The more evidence is
provided, the more reﬁned the appearance model becomes, but it
remains, fundamentally a model of how image features tend to
change, rather than an estimate of physical surface parameters.
The key to the approach is that perceptual organization principles
provide initial constraints on an otherwise limitless space of possi-
ble variations, and that accumulated experience with different
materials allows the visual system to discover reliable dimensions
along which samples tend to vary.
This is, of course, a highly speculative proposal, and raises many
questions about how the putative segmentation processes work,
how the visual system learns which hypotheses to cast in the ﬁrst
place, and how new evidence is incorporated into the model as the
observer gains experience with different surfaces. It is important to
point out that segmenting the image into diffuse and specular
reﬂections, for example, is far from trivial, and a considerable
amount of research still needs to be done to understand how such
perceptual organization mechanisms work. It is likely that the seg-
mentation processes, and resulting appearance model take into ac-
count multiple photo-geometric constraints, such as the
consistency in image orientation between shading gradients and
highlights (Beck & Prazdny, 1981; Fleming, Torralba, & Adelson,
2004; Marlow, Kim, & Anderson, 2011; Todd, Norman, & Mingolla,
2004). It remains unclear at what level these constraints are im-posed. Raw ﬁlter responses and intensity statistics are presumably
not sufﬁcient to measure the relevant relationships between fea-
tures, so additional grouping processes must be involved. At the
same time, it may not be necessary for the visual system to deter-
mine consistency in world coordinates, using explicit estimates of
unseen elements (e.g., light sources, rays, etc.). For example, the vi-
sual system may not necessarily enforce consistency between
shading and highlights in terms of consistency between estimates
of the 3D surface structure and estimates of the light sources using
ray geometry to enforce consistency. Instead, it may detect consis-
tency in terms of image-level features, such as the directions of
intensity gradients that are attributed to different causes. Thus,
‘mid-level’ visual processes (Adelson, 1999) may be sufﬁcient to
express the crucial photo-geometric constraints. By posing gloss
perception this way, we believe we can make progress in under-
standing some of the otherwise confusing effects and interactions
between different scene variables.
5. Theoretical beneﬁts of statistical appearance models
If the visual system cannot or does not estimate intrinsic phys-
ical parameters in the case of surface reﬂectance perception, there
are scant grounds for thinking that it estimates intrinsic physical
parameters for other material properties. Estimating complex
real-world properties, like translucency, elasticity, viscosity or
sponginess—whether through inverse physics or image heuris-
tics—is surely at least as difﬁcult as surface reﬂectance estimation.
We therefore suggest that the general strategy of representing
appearance differences likely applies to the perception of all kinds
of material properties. Indeed, one of the major computational
beneﬁts of inferring an appearance model—as opposed to estimat-
ing physical parameters—is that it is highly ﬂexible: it is uncon-
strained by pre-deﬁned parameters of the physical model, and
can readily adapt to new materials (and new properties) that have
never been seen before. Not only do we encounter new materials
throughout our childhood, from time to time material science also
creates new materials with completely novel appearances, such as
complex paints and textiles with unusual colour characteristics, or
holograms, which have a highly distinctive ‘look’, quite unlike most
natural materials. A brain that represents material properties in
terms of appearance features can learn these new materials by
identifying statistical regularities in the patterns of sensory activity
they evoke.
5.1. Representing arbitrarily complex material properties
More importantly, by focussing on appearance, the visual sys-
tem can capture arbitrarily complex physical processes, as long
as they lead to systematic variations in features that can be easily
measured. For example, consider the cylinders presented in Fig. 7,
from a recent computer graphics article (Narain, Pfaff, & O’Brien,
2013), in which the authors model the crumpling behaviour of thin
Fig. 7. A series of simulated crumpled materials reprinted from Narain, Pfaff, and O’Brien (2013). From left to right, one parameter of the physical model varies, leading to
different crumpling behaviour and a concomitant change in appearance. Image copyright 2013, Narain, Pfaff, and O’Brien, reproduced with permission.
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parameters, which control the behaviour of the material in re-
sponse to external forces (here, a compression of the cylinders).
In the ﬁgure, one of the model parameters varies from left to right
leading to a vivid subjective impression of differences in the prop-
erties of the material.
The cylinder on the left appears to be a thin, papery material, as
seen on a Chinese lantern, whereas the one on the far right appears
to be thicker and more rubbery material, which buckles elastically
under pressure. The underlying physical processes are highly com-
plex, and it seems quite implausible that the visual system has a
sophisticated internal model that captures these physical pro-
cesses and estimates the parameters of the model. However, de-
spite the complexity, at the phenomenological level, the
emergent effects of the crumpling process are relatively straight-
forward, and leave clearly identiﬁable signatures in the shape of
the object. The crumples in the ‘papery’ cylinder are smaller, higher
frequency and have sharper creases than the smooth, large scale
undulations of the ‘rubbery’ cylinder. It seems much more plausi-
ble that the visual system identiﬁes the key statistical differences
between the materials, expressed in terms of these mid-level
appearance characteristics, rather than estimating or approximat-
ing intrinsic parameters.
5.2. Statistical generative models as categorization in high-
dimensional feature spaces
Another important advantage of statistical generative models is
that they embody knowledge about the relationships between
material samples, and are thus more expressive than simple heu-
ristics. A ‘Bag of Tricks’ (Ramachandran, 1985) view of material
perception—based on simple correlations between image features
and physical surface parameters—does not capture a deeper under-
standing of the underlying generative processes that are responsi-
ble for the correlations. In their simplest form, heuristics represent
a case-by-case mapping from sensory measurements to physical
properties. In contrast, by capturing the typical behaviour of mate-
rials with an internal model, the visual system can also predict, to
some extent, what plausible variations of exemplars might look
like, and thus relate samples to one another in meaningful ways.
An internal model adds ‘understanding’ to the heuristics by pre-
dicting the sensory consequences of changing samples and viewing
conditions, much as internal models of limb movements are
thought to predict the sensory consequences of actions (Wolpert,
Miall, & Kawato, 1998).
Indeed, by formulating material perception as the process of
discovering statistical relationships between samples, we can tosome extent unify estimation and categorization into a common
theoretical framework, as depicted in Fig. 8. We can think of indi-
vidual samples of materials as points in a high-dimensional feature
space (Fig. 8a), where the features represent appearance character-
istics, like the smoothness or extendedness of the liquid. Different
materials which differ, for example, in terms of their viscosity, oc-
cur at different locations within the feature space, tracing out a
sub-space or manifold within the space of all possible appearances.
Material estimation is the process of establishing the true position
of a given sample within the feature space (Fig. 8b), and material
categorization is the process of identifying the boundaries separat-
ing different classes of material. A statistical appearance model
facilitates both of these processes because it represents a hypoth-
esis about the shape and internal parameterization of the sub-
space occupied by related materials, and thus determines which
appearance features are important for a given class of material.
In other words, learning to estimate viscosity can be thought of
as the process of working out how to parameterize the sub-space
occupied by viscous materials, for example, through non-linear
dimensionality reduction (Roweis & Lawrence, 2000; Tenenbaum,
de Silva, & Langford, 2000).
A generative model that predicts natural degrees of variation
between samples (Fig. 8c) is equivalent to casting a hypothesis
about the distribution of samples in the feature space (Fig. 8d).
As we experience more material samples, the accuracy of the mod-
el improves, providing more accurate category boundaries as well
as a more accurate representation of the natural dimensions of var-
iation between samples within a class. We have speculated that
the visual system derives initial hypotheses about the likely
dimensions of variation between samples by parsing images into
candidate features. This would potentially allow the visual system
to infer material classes, and identify key dimensions of variation
based on just a small number of exemplars. One of the most
remarkable aspects of material perception is that when presented
with just a small number of samples of related stimuli, we seem to
be able to rapidly identify which features we should use for com-
paring them. One very interesting direction for future research is
to test how subjects learn to recognize and distinguish novel mate-
rials (e.g., using simulations of BRDFs that are quite unlike those
seen in natural materials) from small numbers of exemplars. If
our hypothesis is correct, subjects should be able to identify key
dimensions of variations from just a few samples, allowing them
to predict the appearance of intermediate materials, for example.
This view of material perception is inspired by ideas from
machine learning, which pose learning as a process of inferring
underlying generative processes from data samples (e.g., Kemp &
Tenenbaum, 2008; Schmidt & Lipson, 2009; Tenenbaum et al.,
Fig. 8. Relationship between statistical appearance models and material categorization, based on samples of viscous liquids.
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limited, and distinct physical processes may be conﬂated. For
example, when a runny liquid is poured, the height of the splash
is inﬂuenced by both the viscosity of the liquid and the height over
which the liquid is poured. However, given only limited experi-
ence, the visual system may be unable to distinguish between
these two factors and therefore conﬂate them in its representation
of the liquid. This would show up as apparent errors in ‘estimates
of viscosity’, with the visual system unable to separate the effects
of height from the effects of the intrinsic properties of the material.
Of course, a sufﬁciently detailed appearance model (i.e., one in-
ferred from sufﬁcient samples) should be able to separate distinct
underlying causes as long as these create systematic and distinct
effects on measured image features. By representing samples in a
high-dimensional (over-complete) feature space, the visual system
may be able to tease apart factors that have different physical ori-
gins. Statistical appearance models see this separation as a process
of discovering distinct dimensions of variation between observed
samples distributed in the feature space—rather than the applica-
tion of pre-deﬁned strategies to estimate speciﬁc physical
quantities.
For example, when judging surface lightness, both reﬂectance
and illuminance contribute to the observed image intensity of a
surface patch. Given only isolated luminance measurements, there
is no way in principal to separate the two factors to correctly infer
surface albedo. Therefore, an appearance model based solely on
luminance would confound illuminance and reﬂectance changes:
increasing either factor would make the surface appear brighter.
In traditional parlance, this would be a ‘failure of lightness con-
stancy’, although of course, brightly illuminated surfaces do tend
to appear subjectively brighter (although not lighter), presumably
reﬂecting the fact the image intensity is an important dimension of
variation between samples and thus serves as a useful low-ordercharacterization of appearance, even though it is not speciﬁcally
diagnostic of reﬂectance. However, Gilchrist and Jacobsen (1984)
have shown that observers can distinguish a dark grey room under
bright light from a light grey room under dim light, even when the
average luminance is the same for the two rooms. This shows that
the visual system does not rely solely on raw luminance values to
represent the difference between different samples. In other
words, the appearance model for illuminated matte surfaces is
not unidimensional. The input relies on more features (dimen-
sions) than just luminance, and the resulting appearance model
captures more natural degrees of variation between samples than
just ‘brightness’. The idea that lightness perception probably in-
volves more than one subjective dimension has been discussed
widely (Anderson & Winawer, 2008; Arend & Reeves, 1986; Katz,
1935; Logvinenko & Maloney, 2006; Shapiro, 2008; Vladusich,
2012; Whittle, 1992a, 1992b). According to the statistical appear-
ance model idea, this reﬂects the fact that observers have internal-
ized the statistical ‘look’ of inter-reﬂections, using higher order
image features (contrasts, ﬁlter responses, etc.) in conjunction with
luminance. It is these higher-order degrees of variation between
samples that allow observers to distinguish the distinct contribu-
tions to observed luminance from reﬂectance and illuminance.
5.3. Predicting systematic estimation errors and other eccentricities of
material perception
Importantly, statistical appearance models also predict several
perceptual phenomena that would otherwise be difﬁcult to under-
stand if the visual system’s goal were to estimate physical proper-
ties of surfaces. There are many cases in which scene parameters
have non-intuitive effects on material perception. We have already
suggested that appearance-based explanations may account for
some of these, such as the complex non-monotonic interactions
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Landy, and Maloney (2008) and Marlow, Kim, and Anderson
(2012).
They probably also account for the effects of other scene vari-
ables that we have observed in the perception of transparent mate-
rials (Fleming, Jäkel, & Maloney, 2011). When a thick transparent
object is placed in front of a patterned background, the patterns
that are visible through the object appear spatially distorted due
to refraction. The degree of distortion depends on the refractive in-
dex, a physical parameter of the material that determines how light
is ‘bent’ as it passes through the object. This means that the visual
system could use estimates of the degree of distortion to infer the
material properties of the object. However, the degree of distortion
also varies with other scene variables, including the 3D thickness
of the refracting object, as well as its distance from the background
that is visible through it.
We asked subjects to adjust the refractive index of one simu-
lated object to match the apparent material properties of another
transparent object, which had a different thickness or distance to
the background. We found that subjects’ matches were substan-
tially biased by the thickness or distance of the object, even though
these scene variables have nothing to do with the intrinsic proper-
ties of the material. However, these biases can be easily understood
if instead of estimating the physical refractive index of the trans-
parent objects, subjects simply match the degree of distortion ob-
servable in the image. Because the salient consequence of
refraction is spatial distortion of the background, subjects use this
distortion to capture the appearance of refractive materials.
It is important to note that observing ‘perceptual errors’ in
material perception experiments does not on its own rule out the
possibility that the visual system is trying to estimate physical sur-
face parameters and failing (or only imperfectly succeeding). In-
deed, to equate the estimation of physical properties with perfect
performance would be a ‘straw man’ as it is well known that bio-
logical vision is far from perfect. The point is rather to account
for the speciﬁc pattern of errors. It is difﬁcult to address experi-
mentally the teleological question of the true nature of the visual
system’s ‘goal’. In the limit, a highly detailed and accurate appear-
ance model may yield patterns of results that approximate what a
full inverse optics computation would achieve. Nevertheless, I sug-
gest that where errors are large and systematic (i.e., not just noise),
posing material perception as a process of representing appearance
changes rather than the estimation of internal parameters provides
a useful way to understand patterns of successes and failures. Per-
ceptual theories based on analytical representations of the inverse
optics problem do not readily predict which image information the
visual system relies on, or why in some cases the visual system
fails to compensate for the spurious affects of different scene fac-
tors on image measurements. By contrast ‘statistical appearance
models’, or other data-driven approaches are directly connected
to the image measurements. Thus, appearance models may offer
a way to plug the explanatory gap between simple image measure-
ments and higher-level goals, like representing the structure of the
world in sufﬁcient detail to support successful interactions.
The idea that the visual system does not care about estimating
physical scene parameters may also explain the curious fact that
hue is a circular dimension. It is widely assumed that the goal of
early colour processing is to infer a low dimensional estimate of
the distribution of wavelengths in the stimulus from cone excita-
tions (Wandell, 1995). In spectral terms, narrow-band stimuli that
evoke red and purple colour sensations lie at opposite ends of the
visible spectrum. Despite this, in terms of subjective appearance,
red and purple lie next to one another on the hue circle, which
wraps the two ends of the spectrum close to one another. Purple
appears more similar to red than green does, even though, in phys-
ical (spectral) terms green is closer to red than purple is.If the goal of colour perception were to estimate the physical
spectra of sources or surfaces, and to accurately represent the
physical similarities or differences between stimuli, then this cir-
cularity makes no sense: why should hue be a circular dimension
when wavelength is a linear dimension? In the case of pitch per-
ception, the physical properties of oscillating sound sources tend
to create harmonic relationships between frequencies. This may
explain why tones that are separated by an octave, for example, ap-
pear subjectively similar to one another: raising a harmonic signal
by an octave leads to a physically similar signal (minus the funda-
mental). But in colour, there is no equivalence of harmonic rela-
tionships. Wavelengths are not coupled in the same way because
colours are not created by standing wave oscillators like many
sound sources are, and thus there is no ‘circularity’ in spectral rela-
tionships. One possible explanation is that circularity provides a
way to represent similarity relationships between more complex
spectra: for example placing spectra that are a combination of long
and short wavelengths subjectively in between spectra that con-
tain only short or long wavelengths. However, this could also be
achieved using some Cartesian (rather than polar), organization
of colour space. Another possibility is that the visual system does
not care about representing the physical similarity between stimuli
with different spectra. Instead, there may be some other organiza-
tional principles that beneﬁt from representing hue on a circle. Fu-
ture research—perhaps considering the effects of ripening, changes
in daylight, or internal constraints, like the computation of iso-hue
ﬂow patterns—may provide an explanation of why hue is circular.
In summary, statistical appearance models are easier to com-
pute than physical models, and more expressive than simple heu-
ristics. Such models capture not only the key characteristics of
individual samples, but also the relationships between samples,
including novel samples that have not been seen before, by
representing a material’s natural dimensions of variation. Appear-
ance-based (rather than physics-based) explanations of material
perception account for the otherwise bafﬂing effects of irrelevant
scene variable on material perception. Taken together, this sug-
gests that statistical appearance models represent a powerful and
ﬂexible way of thinking about how the visual system represents
material properties.5.4. Beyond material perception
In this article, we have suggested that when we look at an ob-
ject and experience a vivid subjective impression of its material
properties, we are not actually perceiving its physical properties
at all. Instead, we have learned a set of appearance characteris-
tics—i.e., properties of the way the material tends to appear in
the image—that capture its distinctive ‘look’. The frothy head of
the freshly poured wheat beer doesn’t look like surface tension
and sub-surface scatter in action. It looks like a certain kind of
whitish, softish, stuff that is different in important sensory ways
from the whitish, softish stuff on the inside of a banana skin.
What consequences does this view of material perception have
for the rest of perception? I suggest that the visual characterization
of material appearance is likely to be just a special case of a much
more general perceptual and cognitive faculty for inferring statisti-
cal regularities related to the high-level attributes of things, scenes
and events. The Gestalt psychologists referred to the ‘tertiary’ qual-
ities of sensory experiences, such as the ‘mood’ of a room or the
gracefulness of a ballet dancer. Much of the aesthetic pleasure of
sensory experience seems to reside at this level of experience:
the visual pleasure of seeing a curtain buoyed by a breeze, the
poise of a well-crafted sculpture, or the melancholy air of favourite
melody. How does the visual system represent these aspects of the
world?
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such experiences, as we can judge them consistently and dispute
their relative merits with other observers. Yet, at the same time,
it seems very difﬁcult—perhaps even impossible—to describe what
we are responding to in purely reductive physical terms. When we
hear someone speaking through a wall and can identify a familiar
accent even though we do not understand the words, or when we
note similarities in handwriting style between a father and son, it
seems highly improbable that we are inferring properties of a
physical generative model. What would this even mean? It would
be almost comical to praise the low-level physical characteristics
of a dancer’s movements such as the ratio of tensions in particular
muscle groups. Surely these experiences—the differences between
good and bad dancers, etc.—are expressed along some other kinds
of appearance dimensions. When we experience tertiary properties
of objects, scenes and events, there is no concept of a physical
model. Why, then, should the properties of materials be different?
6. Conclusions
The subjective visual experience of materials and their proper-
ties is vivid and nuanced but poorly understood. Research over the
last decade or so has started to make progress in this important
area but each new ﬁnding seems to raise many new questions. Dif-
ferent senses make fundamentally different kinds of measure-
ments about materials, so how are these different quantities
compared and combined to yield a multi-sensory impression of
material properties? To what extent and in what ways does
semantic knowledge about materials inﬂuence perceptual process-
ing? What limits our ability to generalize perceptual knowledge
about speciﬁc materials—or material classes—to novel viewing sit-
uations? Future research must address questions such as these.
One theoretical idea that has been gaining traction is that the
visual system may rely on a heuristic approach based on various
image statistics that correlate with material properties. Such an ap-
proach is appealing because it would not require the brain to per-
form sophisticated computations to arrive at estimates of material
properties. However, as we have argued here, this approach is not
without its problems. Given that there are often many possible im-
age measurements that correlate to a greater or lesser extent with
any given material property, there is a risk that the ﬁeld will be-
come satisﬁed simply to collect such correlations without seeking
a deeper theoretical understanding of the origin of these cues. It is
important that we test the ability of each hypothesized cue to pre-
dict not only the successes but also the failures of material percep-
tion. Methods must be developed for perturbing the putative
image properties and measuring the consequences for perception,
to establish their causal role in each judgment. Theory must be
developed to model the processes through which the visual system
selects which cues to use for any given material perception task.
Ultimately, we must not only be able to answer the question
‘‘which cues does the visual system use?’’ but also the question
‘‘how does the visual system end up using this cue, rather than
some other?’’ As this area of study matures, we must not allow
material perception research to slip into a theory-blind process
of collecting large numbers of weak correlations. This surely would
not count as a deep understanding of how the brain works out how
stuff looks.
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